

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, N STREET LUNCHEON SEPTEMBER 13,
1977, W. AVERELL HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

We had a genial talk, the four of us including Mrs. Harriman and Mrs. Dobrynin, about his family and other lighter subjects.

I impressed upon him that it was essential now for the Soviets to take seriously our offers and to respond with counterproposals, not simply say no, no, no. He maintained that his government did not take it seriously because his government thought we have acted so arbitrarily in what we have done before. I said these counterproposals should come before the Vance/Gromyko meeting on September 18; but if not, at least at that meeting. He maintained that we ought to accept the commitments that Ford and Kissinger made, not only at Vladivostok but in subsequent agreements. He referred specifically to our refusing to accept aircraft with cruise missiles as MIRV's. I of course maintained that Kissinger never agreed to these things. He said he would try them out, but he was never able to get Ford to put them up to Congress. They were unacceptable and were turned down.

I referred again to Kosygin's statement that since we can both kill each other twenty times over, what difference does it make if one can do it nineteen times and the other twenty-one; and I mentioned President Carter's statement of "rough equivalence." In these circumstances it seemed to me that both sides ^{thinks} ~~were~~ far too technical, and neither side

would lose by coming to an agreement in the range of present discussions.

Agencies in Moscow had an agreement that the Soviet would not do this.
He maintained that it was impossible for Moscow to determine what this

administration is up to, and in this uncertainty they were not prepared

to make counterproposals. I said I thought the message I sent to

Mr. Brezhnev had been helpful. He fully agreed with that. He said

Mr. Brezhnev had reacted favorably to President Carter's ^{Chairman} speech.

On the other hand, there was still suspicion and confusion regarding our intentions. I admitted that there had been reason for uncertainty in the early days, but that I hoped that the suspicions were laid to rest. I said misunderstandings between us are dangerous, and we should do everything we can to clarify the situation. I said that I thought now that Marshall Shulman was spending 100 percent of his time in Washington, things would improve. He said he appreciated his contacts with Marshall and spoke warmly of his relations with Cy Vance, whom he liked very much. He admitted that there was some improvement in relations because Vance was keeping him and Grymko informed on developments in the Middle East and consulting him.

When Dobrynin began to scold me about different things, I said that I would like to read him what I had told Shulman and Warnke in my brief talk with them the day before. I read, "I think the Soviets are really disturbed and uncertain about what U. S. policy really is. This is not healthy. Uncertainty in the Soviet mind is dangerous. The Soviets have misunderstood completely the March SALT offer for the reasons

you know. Also they are upset because we have failed to take into account what they considered were agreements with Kissinger. These agreements could not be binding because they never got the approval of the U. S. Government, and in fact Ford did not dare send them up to the Senate." I said I had to read this to him as I got tired of listening to him scold me. He laughed and agreed.

The meeting was, as usual, cordial, good natured, and relaxed.